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Obesity and the Transition from Unemployment to Employment
* 
 
This paper focuses on estimating the magnitude of any potential weight discrimination by 
examining whether obese job applicants in Germany get treated or behave differently from 
non-obese applicants. Based on two waves of rich survey data from the IZA Evaluation 
dataset, which includes measures that control for education, demographic characteristics, 
labor market history, psychological factors and health, we estimate differences in job search 
behavior and labor market outcomes between obese/overweight and healthy weight 
individuals. Unlike other observational studies which are generally based on obese and non-
obese individuals who might already be at different points in the job ladder (e.g., household 
surveys), in our data, individuals are newly unemployed and all start from the same point. 
The only subgroup we find in our data experiencing any possible form of labor market 
discrimination is obese women. Despite making more job applications and engaging more in 
job training programs, we find some indications that they experienced worse (or at best 
similar) employment outcomes than healthy weight women. Obese women who found a job 
also had significantly lower wages than healthy weight women. 
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kindly gave us permission to use the administrative data. 1. Introduction 
Obesity has recently emerged as a prevalent problem in many developed 
countries. For example, between the periods 1976-1980 and 1999-2000, the 
prevalence of overweight (BMI ≥ 25) persons in the US increased from 46% to 65%, 
and the prevalence of obesity (BMI ≥ 30) increased from 15% to 31% (Flegal et al., 
2002).
1 By 2007-2008, the prevalence of obesity had further increased to 32.2% 
among adult men and 35.5% among adult women (Flegal et al., 2010). Similarly in 
Europe, the prevalence of obesity in men ranged from 4.0% to 28.3% and in women 
from 6.2% to 36.5% during the period 1980-2005. Eastern Europe and the 
Mediterranean countries showed higher prevalences of obesity than countries in 
Western and Northern Europe (Berghöfer et al., 2008). The alarming rise of obesity 
over the years has led to the practice of a new form of discrimination that has received 
relatively little attention in the economics literature – weight discrimination. 
Researchers estimate that at present, weight discrimination is comparable to 
rates of race and age discrimination, especially among women. In 1995-96, weight 
discrimination was reported by 7% of US adults. In 2004-2006, that percentage rose 
to 12% of adults (Andreyeva et al., 2008). Puhl and Brownell (2001) published the 
first comprehensive review of several decades of research documenting bias and 
stigma toward overweight and obese persons. Their review summarized weight 
stigma in domains of employment, health care, and education, demonstrating the 
vulnerability of obese persons to many forms of unfair treatment. It highlighted that 
weight discrimination is rampant in the workplace, health care and education arenas. 
Based on data from the National Survey of Midlife Development in the US, a 
nationally representative sample of adults aged 25–74 years, Roehling et al. (2007) 
found that overweight respondents were 12 times more likely, obese respondents were 
37 times more likely, and severely obese respondents were 100 times more likely than 
normal-weight respondents to report employment discrimination. In addition, women 
were 16 times more likely to report weight-related employment discrimination than 
men. A meta-analysis of 32 experimental studies which investigated weight 
discrimination in employment settings was recently conducted by Roehling et al. 
(2008). Typically, such experimental studies ask participants to evaluate a fictional 
applicant’s qualifications for a job, where his or her weight has been manipulated 
                                                 
1 Body mass index (BMI) is the ratio of weight measured in kilograms, to squared height measured in 
meters. 
  1(through written vignettes, videos, photographs or computer morphing). Outcome 
variables examined in these studies included hiring recommendations, 
qualification/suitability ratings, disciplinary decisions, salary assignments, placement 
decisions, and co-worker ratings. Across studies, it was demonstrated that overweight 
job applicants and employees were evaluated more negatively and had more negative 
employment outcomes compared to non-overweight applicants and employees. 
This paper focuses on examining whether newly unemployed and obese job 
applicants in Germany get treated or behave differently from non-obese applicants. 
Despite evidence that obese people experience discrimination, to date, with the 
exception of the state of Michigan in the US, which enacted a law in 1977 prohibiting 
discrimination against overweight people, there are no laws protecting overweight 
people from discrimination in employment, education, and health care. In Germany, 
the 2006 General Equal Treatment Act (Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz) was 
introduced only after a long and controversial legislative procedure. This was 
intended to be a combination of four EU Equality Directives (2000/43, 2000/78, 
2002/73 and 2004/113) and prohibits discrimination based on race or ethnical origin, 
religion or belief, sex, disability, age or sexual orientation. This paper examines more 
closely whether these new laws had any effects on the outcomes of obese unemployed 
Germans in 2007-2008.
2 In addition to observing the employment outcomes of job 
applicants, a novel feature of our data set is that we also have information on the 
search behavior of job applicants. We therefore will be given insights as to whether 
any observed differences in labor market outcomes have arisen because one group 
simply was less motivated or tried less hard to look for a job, or possibly because they 
had different access to labor market training programs. 
To preview our findings, we find that overweight men, obese men and 
overweight women experience no discrimination in terms of access to programs that 
are part of active labor market policies (ALMP) or in their employment and wage 
outcomes. The only group we find in our data experiencing any possible form of labor 
market discrimination is obese women. Despite making more job applications and 
engaging more in job training programs, we find some indications that they 
experienced worse (or at best similar) employment outcomes than healthy weight 
                                                 
2 Discrimination against the obese is not explicitly mentioned in the 2006 Act but the new anti-
discrimination culture in Germany could plausibly have indirect effects on them. 
  2women. Obese women who found a job also had significantly lower wages than 
healthy weight women. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data in 
more detail. Section 3 provides more background and discusses some theoretical 
motivations, whereas Section 4 presents the methods used. The empirical results are 
provided in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
The IZA-Evaluation Dataset is an ongoing data collection process which is 
specifically designed to shed more light on the transition process from unemployment 
to employment (see Caliendo et al., 2011, for details). It consists of two components, 
an administrative part as well as an additional survey data set. The sampling is 
restricted to individuals who are 16 to 54 years old, and who receive or are eligible to 
receive unemployment benefits under the German Social Code III. The administrative 
part covers a random inflow sample into unemployment for the years 2001-2008 
containing over 920,000 individuals. Administrative records are based on the 
‘Integrated Labour Market Biographies’ of the Institute for Employment Research 
(IAB), containing relevant register data from four sources: employment history, 
unemployment support recipience, participation in active labor market programs, and 
job seeker history. For the complementary survey a random sample of individuals 
who entered unemployment between June 2007 and May 2008 is chosen. From the 
monthly unemployment inflows of approximately 206,000 individuals in the 
administrative records, a 9% random sample is drawn which constitutes the gross 
sample. Out of this gross sample each month representative samples of approximately 
1,450 individuals are interviewed, so that after one year 12 monthly cohorts are 
gathered. The key feature of the data set is that individuals are interviewed shortly 
after they become unemployed and are asked a variety of non-standard questions. In 
addition to measuring an extensive set of individual-level characteristics and labor 
market outcomes, a particular strength of the survey dataset is that it contains many 
non-standard, innovative questions including search behavior, social networks, 
psychological factors, cognitive and non-cognitive skills, subjective assessments on 
future outcomes, and attitudes. As will be discussed in a later section, such rich 
micro-level data are important in helping us identify the effects of obesity on labor 
market outcomes using decomposition and matching approaches. 
  3For the purposes of this paper, we focus on three cohorts of the survey dataset 
(June 2007, October 2007 and February 2008) in which data on height and weight 
were collected. For these three cohorts, two waves of data are available and analyzed 
in this paper. In wave 1, the initial interviews were conducted close to the 
unemployment entry. Wave 2 was conducted one year after entry into unemployment. 
Our analysis sample comprises of the 784 men and 673 women who responded to 
both waves 1 and 2 of the survey; out of these 401 men and 438 women were still 
unemployed and actively searching for a job in wave 1.  
This paper uses body mass index (BMI) as our measure of body size, which is 
based on self-reported weight in kilograms divided by self-reported height in meters 
squared. According to widely used classifications by the U.S. National Institutes of 
Health, an individual who has a BMI below 18.5 is underweight; one whose BMI is 
between 18.5 and 25 is healthy weight; one whose BMI is between 25 and 30 is 
overweight; and one whose BMI is over 30 is obese.
3 Table 1 displays the sample 
sizes of men and women in each of the BMI categories in our data set. Note that as 
there are very few individuals with BMI values below 18.5, we omit this group of 
individuals when performing any further analysis in this paper. 
 
* Table 1 about here * 
 
Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics regarding the socio-demographic 
characteristics of individuals who are of normal weight, overweight and obese. These 
descriptive statistics indicate that there are different types of men and women in each 
of the groups and that naively comparing outcomes across groups will not yield any 
informative insights. For example, obese men tend to be on average older (38.28 
years) than overweight men (36.32 years) or healthy weight men (31.07 years). 
Similarly, obese women tend to be older than overweight women who are in turn 
older then healthy weight women too, where the average ages are 40.92, 38.14 and 
35.70 respectively. In terms of education, it can be seen that a larger proportion of 
healthy weight men had technical college or university degrees as compared to obese 
                                                 
3 Although BMI is not an optimal measure of obesity because it is unable to distinguish between lean 
body mass and body fat (e.g., Burkhauser and Cawley, 2008; Johansson et al., 2009), it is the only 
measure of obesity available in this data set. 
  4men (0.24 vs. 0.21). This difference was more pronounced when comparing healthy 
weight women and obese women (0.32 vs. 0.18). 
As can be seen in Table 2, we also control for labor market history using 
several different measures. Importantly, we observe whether individuals receive 
unemployment benefits and the level of benefits. Since benefits in Germany are 
directly related to previous net income, this should give us a good approximation also 
of the unobservable variables potentially influencing employment outcomes. 
Additionally, we also observe the number of months individuals spent in employment 
and unemployment over their lifetime and later use this information adjusted for age 
in our regression models. Finally, we also have information on the employment status 
of the individuals just before they become registered as unemployed, e.g., whether 
they have been in paid-employment, self-employment, subsidized employment or 
school.  
 
* Table 2 about here * 
 
Table 2 also examines group differences in personality traits and health. With 
regards to personality characteristics, it can be seen that obese men and women have 
lower values for their internal locus of control, which suggest that obese persons are 
more likely to believe that fate or chance primarily determine their life events and 
destiny. Another main difference that can be seen is with regards to health, where 
obese men and women are more likely than non-obese men and women to have bad 
general health and a physical impairment in the last two months. 
 
3. Obesity and labor market outcomes 
Active labor market policies in Germany aim to reintegrate unemployed 
individuals into the labor market. Active and passive labor market policies have been 
reformed substantially between 2003 and 2005 within the ‘Hartz-reforms’, where the 
reforms touched the core elements of the labor market, the organizational structure of 
the labor offices as well as the pension system. As a general goal, the reforms aimed 
at increasing incentives to take up work (see Eichhorst and Zimmermann, 2007, for an 
overview). One of the most substantial parts of the welfare reform (Hartz IV) took 
  5place in the beginning of 2005.
4 Much research has focused on examining the effects 
of different types of training programs – affecting the labor supply side of the market 
– on individual employment outcomes.
5 However, considerable less attention has 
been placed on the demand side of the market. How do employers decide whom to 
hire from a pool of unemployed workers? What factors affect how long they are hired 
for?  
Given the tendency for obesity to be strongly associated with low 
socioeconomic status (e.g., Brunello et al., 2009) and the interest in helping the 
unemployed transition from unemployment to employment, in addition to job training 
programs that aim in helping individuals improve their human capital, considerable 
attention has been put on identifying potential barriers to employment on the supply 
side. For example, Danziger et al. (2000), Jayakody and Stauffer (2000), and 
Corcoran et al. (2004) examine a variety of mental and physical health barriers that 
reduce the probability of labor market success. Considerable less research has been 
devoted to another potential barrier to employment - obesity. With the exception of 
Cawley and Danziger (2005), we are not aware of any other study that focuses on 
obesity as a barrier in helping welfare recipients transition from welfare-to-work. 
A correlation between body weight and labor market outcomes could arise for 
several reasons. As Cawley (2004) notes, the first explanation is that obesity lowers 
wages. This explanation consists of both demand and supply side factors. On the 
supply side, obesity may impair one’s ability to work through having poor health or 
low self-esteem. In addition, obese persons may be less motivated to invest in their 
own human capital. For example, obese persons might place a higher premium on 
present consumption and satisfaction and be less concerned about longer term health 
consequences. They could therefore also plausibly be less likely to engage in 
activities like training, which only have payoffs in the more distant future. On the 
demand side, there could be discrimination by employers. This might arise from 
                                                 
4 Jacobi and Kluve (2007) provide a detailed survey of the reform package. Under Hartz IV, for the 
first time, extensive efforts were made to reintegrate welfare recipients into the labor market. 
Recipients were required to participate in welfare to work programs, and were subject to sanctions for 
non-compliance or rejection of suitable job offers. In these respects, the Hartz IV reform shares many 
similarities with the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA) in the U.S., 
which required most welfare recipients to seek employment. 
5 For example, Card et al. (2009) perform a meta-analysis of 97 studies conducted between 1995 and 
2007 and find that in general, job search assistance programs have relatively favorable short-run 
impacts, whereas classroom and on-the-job training programs tend to show better outcomes in the 
medium-run than the short-run. 
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dealing with them; from employers stereotyping obese workers and thinking that they 
are less productive; or having a higher uncertainty or a lack of knowledge about the 
productivity of obese workers. The second explanation is that low wages or 
unemployment help cause obesity (i.e., the case of reverse causality). This would be 
true if poorer people consume cheaper food high in fat content. The third explanation 
is that there could be unobserved variables that are correlated with both obesity and 
employment (e.g., individual time preference). 
There is a small literature in economics that examines the effects of obesity on 
employment and wages (e.g., Register and Williams, 1990; Loh, 1993; Sargent and 
Blanchflower, 1994; Pagan and Davila, 1997; Harper, 2000). More recent studies in 
this literature have paid more attention to controlling for the possible endogeneity of 
obesity with employment and wages using instrumental variable (IV) approaches 
(e.g., Cawley, 2004; Cawley et al., 2005; Brunello and D’Hombres, 2007; Morris, 
2007; Lindeboom et al., 2010). In addition, lagged body weight has been used in 
place of current body weight in order to avoid the influence of wages on 
contemporaneous weight (e.g., Conley and Glauber, 2006). Fixed effects models have 
also been used to eliminate the influence of time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity 
on weight and wages (e.g., Averett and Korenman, 1996). These studies generally 
tend to find that obese women earn less than healthy-weight women. 
As Garcia and Quintana-Domeque (2006), Cawley (2007) and Lindeboom et 
al. (2010) note, however, establishing convincing causal effects of obesity is not easy. 
For example, it appears that a plausible instrument for obesity is to use the BMI of a 
family member. But there is a possibility that a substantial part of the genes 
responsible for obesity are also responsible for other factors that affect labor market 
success.  
Experiments provide one convincing way of estimating the causal effects of 
obesity. Adopting a field experiment approach, Rooth (2009) identifies differences in 
labor market outcomes due to obesity that can be interpreted as causal. He achieves 
this by weight manipulation of facial photographs attached to job applications. The 
basis for conducting such an experiment comes from lab settings in which 
psychologists and sociologists have been documenting systematic differential 
treatment by employers against obese applicants (e.g., see Roehling, 1999). In his 
experiment, Rooth (2009) sent two equivalent applications to advertised job openings 
  7with the only difference being that one has a picture of a person with normal weight 
and the other has a digitally modified picture to make the same person look obese. A 
key advantage of this approach is that it helps ensure that other supply side 
characteristics of the job applicant are held constant. However, a disadvantage of field 
experiments of this nature is that it focuses on callback rates or offers for an 
interview, and not the actual event of being offered a job.
6 
Given the difficulties in plausibly estimating a causal effect of obesity when 
an experimental design is not feasible, as an alternative, it is possible to perform an 
accounting exercise and simply focus on estimating the magnitude of the raw and 
conditional gap in outcomes between obese and non-obese individuals. In this case, 
the focus is not on estimating average treatment effects but instead on a more general 
issue – estimating the magnitude of any potential discrimination that might lead to 
obese job applicants being treated or behaving differently from non-obese applicants. 
Here, decomposition approaches can be used to distinguish between explained and 
unexplained components of the gap that is observed between obese and non-obese 
individuals.  
 
3.1 Discrimination against the obese – a theoretical perspective 
Employers might choose not to hire obese persons due to widespread negative 
stereotypes that overweight and obese persons are lazy, unmotivated, lacking in self-
discipline, less competent, noncompliant, and sloppy (Puhl and Brownell, 2001). Is 
there an economic rational basis for such discrimination? 
Statistical discrimination is said to occur when rational decision makers use 
aggregate group characteristics to evaluate individuals with whom they interact. As a 
result, individuals belonging to different groups may be treated differently even if 
they share identical observable characteristics in every other respect. The basic 
premise of statistical discrimination is that firms have limited information about the 
skills and turnover propensity of applicants, particularly workers with little labor 
market history. As such, firms have an incentive to use easily observable group 
                                                 
6 In addition to responding to job vacancies using written job applications, approaches using actual 
persons who pretend to have similar qualifications except for the variable of interest (race, gender etc.) 
have also been used. The advantages and disadvantages of these ‘audit tests’ are discussed in more 
detail in Riach and Rich (2002), who provide a broad survey of such field experiments of 
discrimination. 
  8characteristics to ‘statistically discriminate’ among workers if these characteristics are 
correlated with performance (e.g., Altonji and Blank, 1999).  
Several theoretical models of statistical discrimination developed in the 
economics literature suggest why there could be discrimination by employers against 
the obese. In his seminal work on discrimination, Becker (1957) assumes that some 
agents have a ‘taste’ for discrimination. Employers taste for discrimination affects 
profits through wages and hiring decisions. An implication of Becker’s model is that 
preferential hiring occurs – employers are less likely to hire obese workers of 
identical productivity.  
Alternatively, information problems are fundamentally important in labor 
markets. When firms are uncertain about the true abilities and effort levels of 
prospective employees, it is common to turn to group identification as a signal of 
underlying productivity. The statistical discrimination model in Aigner and Cain 
(1977) highlights the type of discrimination that can occur when there is a higher 
uncertainty about the productivity of obese workers. The model posits two groups of 
individuals with known normal distributions of productivity. Although the population 
distribution of productivities is known, the actual productivity of any given worker is 
unobservable to firms. Instead, firms only observe a noisy signal of productivity, 
s μ ε =+ where ε  is 
2 (0, ) N ε σ . Assuming that the signal is noisier for the obese 
than the non-obese, and that firms are risk-averse, Aigner and Cain (1977) show that 
the group with a noisier signal will receive lower average wages. This is because with 
risk aversion, wages depend not only on the conditional expectation of productivity 
but also on the conditional variance of productivity. As a result, hiring rates are 
different across groups even though productivity might be the same. 
Theoretical models of discrimination attempt to rationalize discrimination. 
However, one must also be willing to concede that economic theory cannot fully 
explain the long run existence of discrimination. As Arrow (1998) notes, “[i]t is 
natural to suppose that economic analysis can cast light on the economic effects of 
discrimination. But can a phenomenon whose manifestations are everywhere in the 
social world really be understood, even in only one aspect, by the tools of a single 
discipline?” (p. 91). Darity and Mason (1998) also cast a negative light on the ability 
of economic theory to account for discrimination: “Since Becker's work, orthodox 
microeconomics has been massaged in various ways to produce stories of how 
  9discrimination might sustain itself against pressures of the competitive market. The 
tacit assumption of these approaches has been to find a way in which discrimination 
can increase business profits, or to identify conditions where choosing not to 
discriminate might reduce profits” (p. 82). 
 
3.2 Discrimination against the obese – a practical perspective 
In this section, we turn to factors that are outside the scope of economic theory 
that might help account for discrimination against the obese. Some empirical evidence 
in the literature suggests that there might be logical reasons why employers choose 
not to employ the obese. Finkelstein et al. (2005) report that obesity results in 
significant increases in medical expenditures and absenteeism among full-time 
employees. They estimate that the costs of obesity (excluding overweight persons) at 
a firm with 1000 employees are approximately US$285,000 per year. Cawley et al. 
(2007) found that obese women were 61 percent more likely to miss work time, 
compared to women of healthy weight. For morbidly obese women (BMI 40 or 
higher), the figure rose to 118 percent. For women, obesity was linked to absenteeism 
across all occupational categories. For men, the relationship varied by occupation. For 
example, the likelihood of missed work time among men in professional and sales 
occupations increased along with weight category. In other occupations – including 
managers, office workers, and equipment operators – the risk of missed work time 
increased only for morbidly obese men. Taken as a whole, Cawley et al. (2007) found 
that obesity and morbid obesity was associated with increased rates of work 
absenteeism, with an estimated cost of $4.3 billion (2004 dollars) in the US. 
However, the results of these studies need to be interpreted carefully. Due to 
weight discrimination in health care, overweight patients might be reluctant to seek 
medical care, be more likely to cancel or delay medical appointments, or put off 
important preventative health care services. Viewed in this light, higher absenteeism 
amongst the obese might be the result of discrimination and should not be used to 
justify discrimination. In section 5, we test to see if health is an important channel by 
which the effects of obesity operate. We do so by estimating the obesity gap with and 
without health variables included. If health is an important mediating variable, we 
expect to see any gap between obese and non-obese persons to become smaller when 
health variables are controlled for. 
 
  104. Methodology 
This paper uses a pooled linear decomposition approach to estimate the gap in 
labor market outcomes between obese and healthy weight persons, as well as between 
overweight and healthy weight persons. As we explain below, the approach we use is 
closely related to the estimation of average treatment effects. The main difference is 
that the assumptions we invoke using the decomposition approach are weaker than the 
assumptions underlying the estimation of causal effects. 
 
4.1 Linear decomposition 
A common approach employed in the literature to distinguish between 
explained and unexplained components is to perform a linear decomposition, based on 
the seminal papers of Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973). In the standard Blinder-
Oaxaca (BO) decomposition, separate regressions are estimated for group A 
( iA i YX i β ε =+ ) and for group B ( iB i YX i β ε = + ), where X are individual level 
characteristics that help explain differences in Y. The average gap in outcomes 
( AB YY − ) can be expressed as the sum of two components: 
() ( ) AA B A BB X X ββ −+− X β . The first part is attributed to differences in average 
characteristics between the two groups. The second part is due to differences in 
average returns to the individual characteristics, which may reflect discrimination. 
AB X β  represents the outcome for group B if they were treated as if they were 
members of group A. It also represents the outcome for members of group A, if they 
had the average characteristics of members of group B. An equally valid 
decomposition is to express the components of the gap as: 
() ( ) BA B A BA X X ββ −+− X β . Many papers acknowledge this by reporting the results 
of both decompositions, as well the decompositions from a pooled regression without 
group specific intercepts based on a suggestion by Neumark (1988). 
It is worth thinking carefully about what various types of BO decompositions 
measure precisely. Closely related to the literature on decomposition and the 
estimation of the size of unexplained gaps is the literature on treatment effects. When 
performing a decomposition, one controls for as many possible relevant covariates as 
possible, calling the remaining group difference unexplainable or a gap. Similarly, 
when estimating causal effects, one also controls for as many relevant covariates as 
  11possible in order to make the treatment and control groups as similar as possible. The 
remaining difference between the groups is then referred to as the average treatment 
effect. Their close relationship is immediately obvious when one simply substitutes 
the term ‘treatment effect’ for the term ‘unexplained gap’ in a regression framework. 
Developments in the program evaluation literature have been very useful in 
helping clarify different parameters of interest one might be interested in estimating, 
and helping spell out what the two equally valid versions of the BO decomposition 
accomplish. In the first instance when the average gap is expressed as: 
() ( ) AA B A BB X X ββ −+− X β
                                                
, the focus is on members of group A and we consider the 
hypothetical situation of what happens if they had the average characteristics of 
members of group B. Renaming group A as the treatment group and group B as the 
control group, we can see that this decomposition is closely related to the parameter 
of interest known as the average treatment on the treated (ATT). On the other hand, in 
the opposite case where the focus is on members of group B and we think about what 
happens if they had the average characteristics of members of group A, the parameter 
being estimated is the average treatment on the untreated (ATUT).  
Recently, Elder et al. (2010) suggest that the pooled BO decomposition 
without a group-specific indicator should not be used to distinguish between 
explained and unexplained gaps. They instead suggest the coefficient on a group 
indicator from an OLS regression for obtaining a single measure of the unexplained 
gap, and discuss how this coefficient can essentially be viewed as a weighted average 
of the two different ways of doing a BO decomposition.
7 
Estimating gaps using the OLS approach has been applied to the measurement 
of union wage premiums (e.g., Lewis, 1986), racial test score gaps (e.g., Fryer and 
Levitt, 2004), and racial wage gaps (e.g., Neal and Johnson, 1996). More recently, 
Lundborg et al. (2010) adopt this approach in decomposing the wage gap between 
obese and non-obese individuals.  
 
7 A parallel discussion of this issue can be found in Angrist and Pischke (2008) when discussing the 
different causal parameters that matching and OLS estimate. They note that whereas matching uses the 
distribution of covariates among the treated to weight covariate specific estimates into an estimate of 
the ATT, regression produces a variance weighted average of these effects. What this translates into is 
that while the ATT estimate places most weight on covariate cells containing those who are most likely 
to be treated, regression places most weight on covariate cells where the conditional variance of 
treatment status is largest, which occurs where there are equal number of treatment and control 
observations (Angrist and Pischke, 2008, p.76). 
  12An important advantage of viewing our problem as a decomposition problem 
rather than a treatment effects problem is that we can focus on the relative importance 
of different sets of variables in explaining the observed gap. This can be accomplished 
by estimating various OLS models using different combinations of characteristics. On 
the other hand, a treatment effects approach would focus on providing a single ‘best’ 
estimate of the impact of obesity. Importantly, the decomposition approach also does 
not require us to make the conditional independence assumption (CIA) underlying 
regression or matching estimators that attempt to measure causal effects.
8 
In our paper, we therefore mainly focus on applying the pooled regression 
decomposition approach in order to determine the relative importance of education, 
demographic characteristics, psychological factors and health in explaining the 
obesity gap among unemployed Germans. Since previous studies have sometimes 
observed differences in the effect of body size on the wages of men and women (e.g., 
Averett and Korenman, 1999; Baum and Ford, 2004; Cawley, 2004), we provide 
estimates separately for men and women. In addition to estimating gaps between the 
obese (BMI ≥ 30) and persons of healthy weight (18.5 ≤ BMI < 25), we also conduct 
similar decomposition exercises for comparing persons who are overweight (25 ≤ 
BMI < 30) with persons of healthy weight. 
 
4.2 Matching 
An alternative approach we adopt to estimate the gap in labor market 
outcomes between obese and non-obese persons is to use an approach from the 
treatment effects literature – matching. Utilizing the matching estimator as a tool to 
perform decompositions instead of estimating average treatment effects is similar in 
spirit to the papers by Nopo (2008) and Frölich (2007). Unlike in the standard 
application of matching in the evaluation literature, when matching is used to perform 
a decomposition, it is not necessary that the CIA holds. Any observable that is not 
measured simply falls into the residual term.  
In this paper, we report our matching estimates based on kernel matching. One 
major advantage of kernel matching is the lower variance which is achieved because 
more information is used for constructing counterfactual outcomes. This could be 
                                                 
8 This assumption states that conditional on some set of covariates, the potential outcomes for the obese 
and non-obese are independent of their group status. In practice, unless a rich set of covariates are 
available that are related to both labor market outcomes and obesity, it can be difficult to fulfil this 
assumption. 
  13important as our groups of obese and non-obese persons are rather small. An 
additional advantage of kernel matching comes from the results of Heckman, 
Ichimura, and Todd (1998) who derive the asymptotic distribution of these estimators 
and show that bootstrapping is valid to draw inference for this matching method. This 
allows us to circumvent the issues raised by Abadie and Imbens (2008), pointing out 
that bootstrap methods are invalid for nearest neighbor matching. 
Before applying kernel matching, assumptions have to be made regarding the 
choice of the kernel function and the bandwidth parameter h. The choice of the kernel 
appears to be relatively less important in practice. What is seen as more important is 
the choice of the bandwidth parameter h where a trade-off between a small variance 
and an unbiased estimate of the true density function arises (see the discussion in 
Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). We test the sensitivity of the results with respect to 
different bandwidth choices.  
We provide matching estimates as a robustness check for several reasons. In 
addition to estimating a different parameter, a semi-parametric matching approach 
differs from the parametric BO decomposition approach in two other aspects. First, 
the regression function is no longer specified as linear. Second, the adjusted mean 
labor market outcome is simulated only for the common support subpopulation. While 
this latter issue is largely recognized in the program evaluation literature, it has until 
recently not received much attention in decomposition analysis. For example, by not 
considering the common support restriction, the BO decomposition is implicitly based 
on linear extrapolation and an ‘out-of-support assumption’. Put another way, it 
becomes necessary to assume that the linear estimators of the outcomes are also valid 
out of the support region of individual characteristics for which they were estimated. 
 
5. Results 
We examine the gap between overweight and healthy weight persons, and the 
gap between obese and healthy weight persons on three sets of outcomes variables. 
The first set relates to the job search process of the unemployed individuals in wave 1 
where we observe: (i) the reservation wage and (ii) the search intensity (measured as 
the number of job applications). As we observe these outcomes only for individuals 
still unemployed and actively searching for work in wave 1, the sample size for these 
outcomes is smaller than for the second set of outcomes which relate to participation 
in ALMP programs. Here, we distinguish between three outcome variables. The first 
  14outcome is participation in any ALMP program within the period of registering 
oneself as unemployed and the wave 2 interview. To determine if there are differences 
with respect to participation in human-capital enhancing training programs, we 
consider participation in training programs as a second outcome variable. Finally, to 
test whether there are timing differences in the participation patterns for obese and 
non-obese individuals, we also consider participation in the first six months after 
registering oneself as unemployed (‘early participation’) as an outcome variable. The 
third set of outcomes is from wave 2 and includes the employment status and the 
realized wage for those who have a job. We employ OLS models for all outcomes 
except for cases where the outcome is binary. For models with binary outcomes such 
as employment or participation in ALMP/training programs, we employ probit 
models and report marginal effects at the mean values of the covariates. All 
estimations are conducted separately by gender.  
Table 3 presents estimates of the gap in outcomes between overweight and 
healthy weight men. The column labelled ‘raw gap’ is the unadjusted mean difference 
in outcomes between the two groups, where it can be seen that significant differences 
exist for log reservation wages in wave 1 and employment status in wave 2. This 
implies that overweight men are likely to have higher reservation wages than healthy 
weight men, and are also more likely to be employed in wave 2. Columns (1) to (4) 
each control for different sets of characteristics in order to determine how each of the 
characteristics affect the obesity gap. Column (5) includes education, socio-
demographic and personality variables in a single regression. Column (6) includes all 
the characteristics in column (5) with the further addition of health variables. The 
employment history variables in the ‘other demographics’ category are useful in 
trying to control for the labor supply of individuals in the two weight categories in 
each of our pairwise comparisons in our regression models. This way, any observed 
gap in employment and wage outcomes is more likely to be due to labor demand as 
opposed to labor supply. Column (3) in Table 3 shows that for overweight men, these 
set of variables are instrumental in reducing the significant raw gap in log reservation 
wages. By and large, any gaps found between overweight and health weight men are 
eliminated once we control for education, socio-demographic and other 
characteristics. For example, in column (6), it can be seen that the raw gap in log 
reservation wages is 0.147, but that this is reduced to 0.06 and no longer significant 
once we control for our full set of characteristics. 
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* Table 3 about here * 
 
Table 4 presents estimates of the gap in outcomes between obese and healthy 
weight men. As with the overweight vs. healthy weight comparison for men, there are 
no significant gaps in labor market outcomes once education, socio-demographic and 
other characteristics are controlled for.  
Although our sample is not representative of the German population as a 
whole, our results for overweight and obese men are consistent with the findings in 
Cawley  et al. (2005) who find no correlation between weight and earnings for 
German men using the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). 
 
* Table 4 about here * 
 
For women, the raw data in Table 5 suggest that overweight women are likely 
to have significantly lower reservation wages than healthy weight women, the 
opposite of what was found for men. In addition, overweight women are also less 
likely than healthy weight women to be employed in wave 2, and also to have lower 
log hourly wages in wave 2. However, once the regression models controls for 
various sets of relevant characteristics (columns (5) and (6)), the conditional gaps are 
no longer found to be significant. 
 
* Table 5 about here * 
 
On the other hand, we find that there are interesting and significant conditional 
gaps in search and labor market outcomes for obese women. By wave 2, the model in 
column (5) of Table 6, which has controls for education, socio-demographic variables 
and personality, reveals that obese women are about 13 percentage points less likely 
to be employed relative to healthy weight women; they also earn on average 0.094 
less in terms of log hourly wages. The finding that obese women have lower 
employment levels is noteworthy and surprising as obese women had relatively lower 
reservation wages (-0.139 log points) and made 4.66 more job applications on 
average. Obese women also were 12.3 percentage points more likely to participate in 
  16a training program and 10.2 percentage points more likely to enrol early in an active 
labor market program.
9 
If the obesity gap is due to health limitations, we expect the obesity coefficient 
to become smaller and insignificant once we control for health. When we control for 
health (column 6), the conditional gap in search intensity and participation in training 
and labor market programs between obese women and healthy weight women remains 
statistically significant. In addition, the gap in hourly wages is also still statistically 
significant. Although the gap in employment levels is reduced and becomes barely 
insignificant (p-value is 0.14), the point estimate of the difference (0.097) remains 
quite large. 
 
* Table 6 about here * 
 
When both health and cognitive skills are controlled for, the gaps in the 
ALMP variables remain statistically significant but the effects on both employment 
and wages lose their significance (results not shown). It is possible that this lack of 
statistical significance could be due to small sample size as the point estimates for 
employment (-0.055) and log hourly wages (-0.082) are still suggestive that a gap 
exists.
10 On the other hand, having insignificant gaps are consistent with the findings 
in Lundborg et al. (2010) who argue that the negative association between obesity and 
earnings runs mainly through obesity’s association with a variety of supply side 
characteristics such as cognitive skills, non-cognitive skills and measures of physical 
fitness. 
As a robustness check, we also use a matching estimator to provide estimates 
of the obesity gap. We focus on the results from a propensity score specification that 
does not include any potentially endogenous variables such as health (i.e., the 
specification in column (5) of the regression models). 
                                                 
9 There were no significant differences in participation in labor market programs in wave 2 (results not 
shown) so it is unlikely the case that obese women were less likely to be employed in wave 2 because 
they were still part of a program or undertaking training. 
10 The results of the models including cognitive skills (based on the results from three tests on 
arithmetic and one test on word recall) are not shown in an additional column in Tables 3 to 6 because 
about 10 percent of our sample did not respond to those questions. As a result, differences in the results 
between models that did and did not include cognitive skills could reflect either the importance of 
cognitive skills or be due to non-random selection and a different sample composition. We choose not 
to estimate all our models on respondents with non-missing values of measures of cognitive skills in 
order to not further reduce our sample size.  
  17Based on kernel matching estimates using the Epanechnikov kernel and 
experimenting with alternative bandwidths, there appear to be no significant effects of 
obesity on labor market outcomes for men, and only significant results for obese 
women. In other words, the matching results for obese women largely reflect the 
regression estimates reported in column (5) of Table 6.  
 
* Table 7 about here * 
 
Overall, the matching estimates which do not control for health status suggest 
that only obese women suffer some labor market consequences. The finding that the 
negative consequences of obesity on labor market outcomes are greater for females 
than for males is consistent with the findings from other studies analysing the impact 
of obesity on labour market outcomes (e.g., Baum and Ford, 2004; Cawley, 2004; 
Harper, 2000; Morris, 2007; Sargent and Blanchflower, 1994).  
 
6. Conclusions 
The economics literature has focused on estimating the effects of many 
different forms of discrimination. Like other forms of discrimination, weight 
discrimination is highly dependent on public perception. It is therefore a useful 
exercise to carry out empirical studies on many different subgroups of the population 
to measure the full extent of any discrimination that might exist in society. In this 
paper, we examined the issue of whether obese job applicants that newly enter 
unemployment in Germany have different job search behaviors from non-obese 
applicants, whether they participate at the same rate in ALMP programs and whether 
they are regarded differently by employers. The thought experiment was to hold a 
‘beauty contest’ where employers choose whom to hire first from a line up of 
unemployed persons. Unlike other observational studies which are generally based on 
obese and non-obese individuals who might already be at different points in the job 
ladder (e.g., household surveys), in this case, individuals all start from the same point 
– they are newly unemployed. In the sense that we are trying to create a hypothetical 
experiment whereby individuals newly entering unemployment are assigned to 
different weight groups, our study design might be viewed as being somewhere in-
between an experimental study and a standard observational study. 
  18  Our results suggest that no discrimination occurs for overweight males and 
females. Obese men also do not appear to suffer any forms of discrimination. The 
only group we find in our data experiencing any possible form of labor market 
discrimination is obese women. Compared to healthy weight women, obese women 
made more job applications and engaged more in job training programs. At the same 
time we find some indications that they experienced worse (or at best similar) 
employment outcomes than healthy weight women. One possible interpretation of 
these results is that obese women need to search harder in order to achieve similar 
employment outcomes as healthy weight women. Obese women who found a job also 
had significantly lower wages than healthy weight women even after controlling for 
an extensive set of personal characteristics. Although this might partly be an empirical 
realization of the fact that obese women were willing to accept lower wages to begin 
with, it could also reflect discrimination on the part of employers. 
Our data do not allow us to disentangle whether health problems amongst the 
obese might be the result of past discrimination, or whether obesity causes health 
problems. Further research on understanding the interaction between obesity, health 
and labor market outcomes will be useful. 
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Table 1: Sample Sizes 
 
  Full Sample  Searching for Job in Wave 1 
  Men Women Men Women 
18.5 ≤ BMI < 25  391  424  192  272 
25 ≤ BMI < 30  284  159  153  107 
BMI ≥ 30  109  90  56  59 
Total  784 673 401 438 
 
Note: People with a BMI smaller than 18.5 are excluded. We also exclude individuals with missing 
values in key regressors. 
 
 




18.5 ≤ BMI 
< 25 
(Men) 
25 ≤ BMI < 
30 
(Men) 
BMI ≥ 30 
(Women) 
18.5 ≤ BMI 
< 25 
(Women) 
25 ≤ BMI < 
30 
(Women) 
BMI ≥ 30 
West  Germany    0.68 0.75 0.76 0.72 0.73 0.63 
German  citizenship    0.96 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.96 0.96 
Migration  background    0.13 0.14 0.13 0.17 0.14 0.12 
Age    31.07 36.32 38.28 35.70 38.14 40.92 
Married (or cohabiting)   0.21  0.36  0.44  0.43  0.57  0.54 
One  child    0.17 0.13 0.17 0.22 0.19 0.23 
Two (or more) children   0.10  0.14  0.14  0.18  0.21  0.10 
Unemplomyent beneﬁt recipient (yes)   0.74  0.79  0.80  0.71  0.78  0.70 
Level of UB (missing=0)   453.79  617.63  661.60  391.10  435.21  386.06 
School leaving degree  (Reference = none)             
Lower  secondary  school    0.28 0.28 0.49 0.17 0.21 0.30 
Middle secondary school   0.36  0.40  0.28  0.34  0.47  0.50 
Specialized  upper  secondary  school    0.33 0.29 0.22 0.48 0.29 0.18 
Vocational Training (Reference = none)             
Internal or external professional training, others   0.63  0.64  0.66  0.61  0.73  0.72 
Technical college or university degree   0.24  0.27  0.21  0.32  0.18  0.18 
Employment status before unemployment              
Employed    0.59 0.64 0.65 0.63 0.58 0.66 
Subsidized  employment    0.04 0.05 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.04 
School, apprentice, military, etc.   0.29  0.21  0.14  0.16  0.13  0.12 
Maternity  leave    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.13 0.08 
Other    0.08 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.10 
(continued) 
  25   26 
Characteristic  
(Men) 
18.5 ≤ BMI 
< 25 
(Men) 
25 ≤ BMI < 
30 
(Men) 
BMI ≥ 30 
(Women) 
18.5 ≤ BMI 
< 25 
(Women) 
25 ≤ BMI < 
30 
(Women) 
BMI ≥ 30 
Lifetime months in unemployment (divided by age-18)   0.86  0.61  0.74  0.60  0.79  0.79 
Lifetime months in employment (divided by age-18)   7.69  8.64  9.56  6.91  8.18  7.98 
Alcohol  Consumption        
almost  every  day    0.08 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01 
3-4 times a week   0.14  0.14  0.13  0.07  0.05  0.04 
1-2 times a week   0.35  0.37  0.26  0.27  0.23  0.14 
more seldom than once a week   0.28  0.25  0.29  0.43  0.43  0.40 
never    0.16 0.15 0.28 0.20 0.29 0.40 
Personality  Variables          
Internal Locus of Control (7 = high, 1 = low)  5.13  5.17  4.97  5.12  4.89  4.93 
Openness (7= high, 1 = low)   5.09  5.13  4.98  5.04  4.88  5.02 
Conscientiousness  (7= high, 1 = low)  5.99  6.11  6.01  6.21  6.19  6.14 
Extraversion  (7= high, 1 = low)  4.99  4.99  5.04  5.20  5.23  5.25 
Neuroticism  (7= high, 1 = low)  3.40  3.41  3.88  3.84  3.93  3.99 
General Health Condition (1 = very good, 5 = bad)   1.75  2.04  2.27  1.81  2.25  2.48 
Emotional Impairment in last 2 months (1 = always, 5 = never)   4.28  4.20  4.04  4.06  4.05  3.89 
Physical Impairment in last 2 months (1 = always, 5 = never)   4.47  4.33  4.11  4.21  3.96  3.92 
Smoking (1 = yes, 2 = no)   1.47  1.54  1.57  1.61  1.70  1.60 
        
n  391 284 109 424 159  90 
 







Raw  gap  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Search Variables            
Log Reservation Wage 
(a)  1.97  0.147***  0.115*** 0.048 0.135***  0.144*** 0.052  0.06 
Number of Job Applications 
(a)  15.29 1.218 0.708 1.994 0.753 1.210 0.936 0.805 
Participation in ALMP Variables            
Any ALMP  0.31  -0.014  -0.017  -0.033 -0.013 -0.017 -0.032 -0.037 
Participation in Training  0.16  -0.008  -0.010 -0.007 -0.005 -0.014 -0.007 -0.014 
Early Participation in ALMP  0.14  -0.018  -0.017 -0.016 -0.018 -0.022 -0.015 -0.022 
Outcome Variables in Wave 2         
Employed    0.62 0.066*  0.054 0.029 0.056  0.081**  0.023 0.033 
Log Hourly Wages in € 
(b) 2.15  0.069  0.069  -0.025  0.055  0.063  -0.020  -0.025 
          
Controls for education                    
Controls for other demographics                   
Controls for personality                    
   
Controls for health                 
          
n   675 675  675  675  675  675  675 
        
 
Note: Significant at the: *10 percent level; **5 percent level; ***1 percent level. For the detailed list of variables in each of the categories (education, other demographics 
etc.), see Appendix A. We employ OLS models for the reservation wage, the number of job applications and the hourly wage. For the participation in ALMP variables and 
employment outcomes we use probit models and report marginal effects at the mean values of the covariates.  
(a) Only observed for those who are unemployed in wave 1 (n = 327). 
(b) Only observed for those who are employed in wave 2 (n = 400). 
 







Raw  gap  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Search Variables            
Log Reservation Wage 
(a)  1.97  0.057 0.064 -0.003 0.104 0.053 0.049 0.063 
Number of Job Applications 
(a)  15.29 0.868 0.494 0.987 0.842 1.306 -0.013 0.479 
Participation in ALMP Variables            
Any ALMP  0.31  0.002  -0.009  -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.007 
Participation  in  Training  0.16  0.037 0.022 0.059 0.015 0.027 0.021 0.022 
Early  Participation  in  ALMP  0.14  0.009 -0.002 0.036 -0.011 0.011 0.007 0.011 
Outcome Variables in Wave 2         
Employed    0.62  -0.019  -0.031 -0.120** -0.009  0.03  -0.105  -0.078 
Log Hourly Wages in € 
(b)  2.15  -0.007 0.011 -0.078 0.011 -0.008 -0.043 -0.061 
          
Controls for education                    
Controls for other demographics                   
Controls for personality                    
   
   
Controls for health                 
        
n   500  500  500  500  500  500  500 
        
 
Note: Significant at the: *10 percent level; **5 percent level; ***1 percent level. For the detailed list of variables in each of the categories (education, other demographics 
etc.), see Appendix A. We employ OLS models for the reservation wage, the number of job applications and the hourly wage. For the participation in ALMP variables and 
employment outcomes we use probit models and report marginal effects at the mean values of the covariates. 
(a) Only observed for those who are unemployed in wave 1 (n = 232). 
(b) Only observed for those who are employed in wave 2 (n = 292). 







Raw  gap  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Search Variables             
Log Reservation Wage 
(a) 1.96  -0.082**  -0.019  -0.012 -0.078* -0.062  -0.002  0.01 
Number of Job Applications 
(a)  12.63 0.424 1.011 1.538 -0.047 0.500 1.848 1.871 
Participation in ALMP Variables           
Any  ALMP  0.33  0.003 -0.007 -0.019 0.003 0.007 -0.028 -0.033 
Participation in Training  0.21  -0.015  -0.024 -0.037 -0.021 -0.032 -0.042 -0.058 
Early Participation in ALMP  0.18  -0.022  -0.030 -0.034 -0.026 -0.033 -0.039 -0.051 
Outcome Variables in Wave 2         
Employed   0.70  -0.107**  -0.084*  -0.067 -0.095** -0.064  -0.053  -0.015 
Log Hourly Wages in € 
(b)  2.11  -0.093* -0.016 -0.088*  -0.083*  -0.091* -0.020  -0.021 
          
Controls for education                    
Controls for other demographics                   
Controls for personality                    
       
   
   
Controls for health         
        
n   583  583  583  583  583  583  583 
        
 
Note: Significant at the: *10 percent level; **5 percent level; ***1 percent level. For the detailed list of variables in each of the categories (education, other demographics 
etc.), see Appendix A. We employ OLS models for the reservation wage, the number of job applications and the hourly wage. For the participation in ALMP variables and 
employment outcomes we use probit models and report marginal effects at the mean values of the covariates. 
(a) Only observed for those who are unemployed in wave 1 (n = 367). 
(b) Only observed for those who are employed in wave 2 (n = 358). 
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Raw  gap  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Search Variables            
Log Reservation Wage 
(a)  1.96  -0.214*** -0.148*** -0.163*** -0.212*** -0.187***  -0.139**  -0.123** 
Number of Job Applications 
(a) 12.63  3.952*  4.179* 4.472** 3.762*  4.350* 4.660**  5.200** 
Participation in ALMP Variables           
Any  ALMP  0.33  0.014 0.015 0.044 0.018 0.042  0.05  0.071 
Participation  in  Training  0.21  0.101*  0.09*  0.117* 0.105** 0.101* 0.123**  0.123** 
Early Participation in ALMP  0.18  0.076  0.066  0.099*  0.079  0.068  0.102*  0.095* 
Outcome Variables in Wave 2         
Employed 0.70  -0.165***  -0.140**  -0.143** -0.156*** -0.116**  -0.132**  -0.097 
Log Hourly Wages in € 
(b)  2.11  -0.198*** -0.104* -0.167***  -0.204*** -0.164***  -0.094*  -0.092* 
          
Controls for education                    
Controls for other demographics                   
Controls for personality                    
       
   
   
Controls for health         
        
n   514  514  514  514  514  514  514 
        
 
Note: Significant at the: *10 percent level; **5 percent level; ***1 percent level. For the detailed list of variables in each of the categories (education, other demographics 
etc.), see Appendix A. We employ OLS models for the reservation wage, the number of job applications and the hourly wage. For the participation in ALMP variables and 
employment outcomes we use probit models and report marginal effects at the mean values of the covariates. 
(a) Only observed for those who are unemployed in wave 1 (n = 321). 
(b) Only observed for those who are employed in wave 2 (n = 320). 





(bw = 0.02) 
Kernel 
Matching 
(bw = 0.06) 
Kernel 
Matching 
(bw = 0.2) 
n for Treated  n for Control 
       
a) Overweight Men versus Healthy Weight Men 
       
Log Reservation Wage  0.065  0.072  0.085*  146  181 
Number of Job Applications  0.821  0.815  1.001  144  180 
Any  ALMP  -0.020 -0.024 -0.023  284  391 
Participation in Training  -0.001  0.001  -0.003  284  391 
Early Participation in ALMP  -0.021  -0.018  -0.018  284  391 
Employed in Wave 2  -0.001  0.011  0.019  284  391 
Log Hourly Wages at Wave 2  -0.026  -0.015  0.008  176  224 
       
b)  Obese Men versus Healthy Weight Men 
       
Log Reservation Wage  0.017  0.021  -0.001  51  181 
Number of Job Applications  1.382  -0.942  1.170  51  180 
Any  ALMP  0.015 0.018 0.008  109  391 
Participation in Training  0.052  0.064  0.056  109  391 
Early Participation in ALMP  0.023  0.034  0.028  109  391 
Employed in Wave 2  -0.075  -0.078  -0.059  109  391 
Log Hourly Wages at Wave 2  -0.111  -0.068  -0.038  68  224 
       
c) Overweight Women versus Healthy Weight Women 
       
Log  Reservation  Wage  -0.012 -0.008 -0.023  104  263 
Number of Job Applications  0.845  0.935  1.044  103  260 
Any ALMP  0.005  -0.005  -0.008  159  424 
Participation in Training  -0.019  -0.031  -0.028  159  424 
Early Participation in ALMP  -0.025  -0.033  -0.033  159  424 
Employed in Wave 2  -0.069  -0.063  -0.067  159  424 
Log Hourly Wages at Wave 2  -0.047  -0.052  -0.067  87  271 
       
d) Obese Women versus Healthy Weight Women 
       
Log Reservation Wage  -0.140*  -0.125  -0.134**  58  256 
Number of Job Applications  5.220  4.993  4.719*  58  253 
Any  ALMP  0.088 0.073 0.055  90  424 
Participation in Training  0.159***  0.145***  0.130**  90  424 
Early Participation in ALMP  0.131**  0.122**  0.109**  90  424 
Employed in Wave 2  -0.106  -0.104  -0.118*  90  424 
Log Hourly Wages at Wave 2  -0.128*  -0.119**  -0.126**  49  271 
       
 
Note: Propensity score models are estimated using the full set of covariates used in Model 5 of the regression 
results. Matching is performed using the Epanechnikov kernel. Common support is imposed using the min-max 
criterion. Imposing common support using 5% trimming resulted in similar results and is not shown. Standard errors 
are based on bootstrapping with 100 replications. Significant at the: *10 percent level; **5 percent level; ***1 
percent level. 
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Appendix A 
 
List of variables used in the regression models in Tables 3-6: 
 
 
Education variables:   school leaving degree (none, lower secondary, middle secondary, 
specialized secondary), vocational training (professional training, 
technical college or university degree).   
 
Other demographic variables:  West Germany, citizenship, married, number of children (0, 1, 2+), 
unemployment benefit recipient, level of benefits, age (17-24, 25-34, 
35-44, 45-55), lifetime months in unemployment, lifetime months in 
employment, month of entry into unemployment, employment status 
before unemployment (employed, subsidized employment, 
school/apprentice/military, maternity leave, other), local 
unemployment rate (<5%, 5-10%, 10-15%,15+%), alcohol 
consumption (almost every day, 3-4 times a week, 1-2 times a week, 
more seldom than once a week, never). 
 
Personality variables:   openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism, internal locus 
of control index. 
 
Health variables:   general health condition (1=very good, 5=bad), emotional 
impairment in last 2 months (1=always, 5=never), physical 
impairment in last 2 months (1=always, 5=never), smoking. 
 
 
 
 
 